Incident with Git Operations

What to do

• Check whether you use GitHub Git Operations. Check your stack

  Paste a package.json, lockfile, Terraform or a list of domains at down.guide/stack to see every provider you depend on.

• Confirm your retries, queues and scheduled jobs caught up after the 1h 44m it lasted.

  Anything that failed between 2026-11-03 20:57 UTC and 2026-11-03 22:41 UTC may need a replay.

• Subscribe to GitHub's feed to hear about the next one first. RSS feed

  https://down.guide/feed?provider=github works in Slack (/feed subscribe), Discord feed bots and any RSS reader.

Updates from GitHub 6

1. investigatingNov 3, 2026, 8:57 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Git Operations

   provider

2. investigatingNov 3, 2026, 9:37 PM UTC

   We have identified the issue impacting Git Operations and are beginning to roll out a mitigation. We will follow up with another update when we begin to see recovery.

   provider

3. investigatingNov 3, 2026, 10:05 PM UTC

   Our mitigation is rolled out and customers should start seeing improvements to Git Operations. We will continue to provide updates on mitigation status.

   provider

4. investigatingNov 3, 2026, 10:37 PM UTC

   We are seeing significant improvement, though some Git Operations may be slow for a small set of customers. We are marking this as mitigated and will continue to monitor.

   provider

5. monitoringNov 3, 2026, 10:37 PM UTC

   The degradation affecting Git Operations has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

   provider

6. resolvedNov 3, 2026, 10:41 PM UTC

   On November 3, 2026, between 15:00 UTC and 22:37 UTC, Git operations over HTTPS on GitHub.com were degraded. Clones, fetches, and pushes over HTTPS were slow, and some failed. For about half of Git HTTPS traffic, median response time rose from under 100 milliseconds to as high as 5 seconds. On average, the error rate was 0.65% and peaked at 1.29% of requests to the service. Git operations over SSH were not affected. This was due to a buildup of excess connections on the hosts that serve Git HTTPS traffic, which saturated their network capacity and caused slow and failed responses for all clients served by those hosts. We mitigated the incident by blocking a client traffic pattern at our load balancers and reloading them, which released the excess connections. The block also prevented some users of one third-party integration from performing Git operations over HTTPS until we removed it on November 4 at 13:26 UTC. We are working to alert on sustained Git HTTPS latency sooner and make load balancer mitigations take effect on existing connections immediately.

   provider

Corrections

None so far.

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