# Multiple services were experiencing issues in the europe-west2 region.

- Provider: [Google Cloud](https://down.guide/gcp)
- Level: confirmed
- Impact: Partial outage
- lasted 6h 8m
- started 2026-10-20 06:00 UTC
- AlloyDB for PostgreSQL, Apigee, BigQuery Data Transfer Service +35
- eu, europe-west2
- id: DWN-65c8810bc5
- Official page: https://status.cloud.google.com/incidents/Xs2XTHzAVC9YnafnPyzj

## Root cause
> Due to a power event we had suffered an outage within europe-west2-b zone.

Category: Data center or power. [Postmortem](https://status.cloud.google.com/incidents/Xs2XTHzAVC9YnafnPyzj)

## Updates from Google Cloud
### 2026-10-20 08:35 UTC: service\_disruption
\*\*Summary\*\*
Multiple services are experiencing issues in the europe-west2 region.
\*\*Description\*\*
We are experiencing an issue with multiple services in europe-west2 beginning on Monday, 2026-10-19 23:08 PDT.
Our engineering team continues to investigate the issue.
We will provide an update by Tuesday, 2026-10-20 02:30 PDT with current details.
We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption.
\*\*Symptoms\*\*
Multiple Google Cloud services are experiencing elevated errors and intermittent network failures in europe-west2 region.
\*\*Workaround\*\*
None for now

### 2026-10-20 09:24 UTC: service\_disruption
\*\*Summary\*\*
Multiple services are experiencing issues in the europe-west2 region.
\*\*Description\*\*
We are experiencing an issue with multiple services in europe-west2 beginning on Monday, 2026-10-19 23:08 PDT.
Our engineering team continues to investigate the issue.
We will provide an update by Tuesday, 2026-10-20 04:00 PDT with current details.
We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption.
\*\*Symptoms\*\*
Multiple Google Cloud services are experiencing elevated errors and
intermittent network failures in europe-west2 region.
Note: Looker Studio is not impacted by this outage.
\*\*Workaround\*\*
If feasible, the impacted customer may try to migrate their workload impacted to another available location (zone or region).

### 2026-10-20 11:00 UTC: service\_disruption
\*\*Summary\*\*
Multiple services are experiencing issues in the europe-west2 region.
\*\*Description\*\*
We are experiencing an issue with multiple services in europe-west2 beginning on Monday, 2026-10-19 23:08 PDT.
Our engineering team continues to investigate the issue.
We will provide an update by Tuesday, 2026-10-20 05:00 PDT with current details.
We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption.
\*\*Symptoms\*\*
Multiple Google Cloud services are experiencing elevated errors and
intermittent network failures in europe-west2 region.
Note: Looker Studio is not impacted by this outage.
\*\*Workaround\*\*
If feasible, the impacted customer may try to migrate their workload impacted to another available location (zone or region).

### 2026-10-20 11:12 UTC: service\_disruption
\*\*Summary\*\*
Multiple services are experiencing issues in the europe-west2 region.
\*\*Description\*\*
We are experiencing an issue with multiple services in europe-west2 beginning on Monday, 2026-10-19 23:08 PDT.
Due to a power event we had suffered an outage within europe-west2-b zone. The power event is mitigated. Partial mitigation to infrastructure services will be observed within the next 30 minutes and the remaining services will be mitigated there after.
We will provide an update by Tuesday, 2026-10-20 05:00 PDT with current details.
We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption.
\*\*Symptoms\*\*
Google Cloud services are unavailable in europe-west2-b zone; some services in europe-west2 region may experience elevated errors and intermittent network issues.
\*\*Workaround\*\*
If feasible, the impacted customer may try to migrate their workload impacted to another available location (zone or region).

### 2026-10-20 11:58 UTC: service\_disruption
\*\*Summary\*\*
Multiple services are experiencing issues in the europe-west2 region.
\*\*Description\*\*
We are experiencing an issue with multiple services in europe-west2 beginning on Monday, 2026-10-19 23:08 PDT.
A power event caused an outage within europe-west2-b zone. The power event is mitigated. We are seeing the recovery of services and are prioritizing the recovery of existing workloads.Customers may not be able to yet create new workloads.
Full recovery of existing workloads should be completed, tentatively by Tuesday, 2026-10-20 06:00.
We will provide an update by Tuesday, 2026-10-20 06:00 PDT with current details.
We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption.
\*\*Symptoms\*\*
Google Cloud services are unavailable in europe-west2-b zone; some services in europe-west2 region may experience elevated errors and intermittent network issues.
\*\*Workaround\*\*
If feasible, the impacted customer may try to migrate their workload impacted to another available location (zone or region).

### 2026-10-20 12:44 UTC: service\_disruption
\*\*Summary\*\*
Multiple services are experiencing issues in the europe-west2 region.
\*\*Description\*\*
We are seeing the recovery of services for most workloads in europe-west2 as of Tuesday, 2026-10-20 05:10 PDT.
We will provide an update by Tuesday, 2026-10-20 07:00 PDT with current details.
We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption.
\*\*Symptoms\*\*
Google Cloud services are unavailable in europe-west2-b zone; some services in europe-west2 region may experience elevated errors and intermittent network issues.
\*\*Workaround\*\*
If feasible, the impacted customer may try to migrate their workload impacted to another available location (zone or region).

### 2026-10-20 14:03 UTC: service\_disruption
\*\*Summary\*\*
Multiple services were experiencing issues in the europe-west2 region.
\*\*Description\*\*
The issue with impacted GCP products has been mitigated for most of the customers and it is believed to be affecting currently a very small number of customers and our Engineering Team is working on it.
If you have questions or are impacted, please open a case with the Support Team and we will work with you until this issue is resolved.
No further updates will be provided here.
We will publish an analysis of this incident once we have completed our internal investigation.
We thank you for your patience while we're working on resolving the issue.
\*\*Symptoms\*\*
Google Cloud services were unavailable in europe-west2-b zone; some services in europe-west2 region might experienced elevated errors and intermittent network issues.
\*\*Workaround\*\*
None as the issue has been mitigated.

### 2026-10-22 08:42 UTC: resolved
## Preliminary Incident Report
We recognize that Google Cloud services are critical to your organization, and we sincerely apologize for the disruption this incident may have caused to your business. We are working to address the root cause and prevent this from occurring in the future.
Please note, this information is based on our best knowledge at the time of posting and is subject to change as our investigation continues. A final Incident Report with preventative actions will be posted once our investigation is complete.
If you have experienced impact outside of what is listed below, please reach out to Google Cloud Support using \[\*\*https\\://cloud.google.com/support\*\*\](https://cloud.google.com/support).
## Date/Time of the Issue
Incident Start:19 Oct 2026 23:00 US/Pacific / 20 Oct 2026 07:00 BST
Incident End: 20 Oct 2026 05:10 US/Pacific / 20 Oct 2026 13:10 BST
Duration: 6 hours, 10 minutes
## Summary
On Monday, 19 October 2026 (Tuesday, 20 October BST), multiple Google Cloud Platform services in the europe-west2 region experienced service disruptions, elevated error rates, Application Programming Interface (API) timeouts, and processing latency for a duration of 6 hours and 10 minutes. The disruption was triggered by an electrical power interruption at the datacenter facility hosting availability zone europe-west2-b, which temporarily took physical host servers, network routing hardware, and storage systems offline. This subsequently caused secondary failover and queuing delays across unimpacted regional infrastructure. 
## Preliminary Root Cause
The incident was triggered when a power grid disruption occurred at the datacenter facility hosting availability zone europe-west2-b. To maintain continuous power during the disruption, automatic transfer to facility backup power systems was triggered immediately. The facility load was transferred to the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) battery banks during the start up sequence of on-site emergency diesel generators. The Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) automation system (both primary and backup PLCs) failed to initiate the logical automatic start/transfer operations of the generators, preventing backup generators from assuming the load. When UPS battery reserves were depleted, physical host servers, network switching fabric, and local storage arrays dedicated to europe-west2-b lost power and went offline.
The sequence of events leading to customer impact was as follows:
\* At 22:53 US/Pacific (20 Oct, 06:53 BST), an electrical power disruption occurred at the datacenter facility hosting availability zone europe-west2-b, and a PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) startup fault prevented facility emergency generators from assuming the electrical load. Facility load continued to be supported by UPS battery banks until the batteries were depleted, starting at 23:00 US/Pacific (20 Oct, 07:00 BST).
\* When the physical host servers, local storage infrastructure, and network aggregation hardware in europe-west2-b lost power, it caused instances, database replicas, and worker nodes in that zone to become immediately unreachable.
\* Regional traffic-routing mechanisms and client applications initiated automated failover toward available infrastructure in adjacent availability zones within the region.
\* Cross-zone remote procedure calls from regional service control planes directed to metadata and catalog components in the offline zone encountered timeouts, causing initial job submission stalls and API latency spikes.
\* The sudden influx of redirected query executions, high-availability database failovers, and compute workloads saturated available compute slots and processing capacity in other availability zones, creating elevated admission queues, delayed database failover completions, and intermittent 500 and 503 API errors across the region.
Google engineers have begun a full root cause analysis (RCA) and will provide additional information once it is available.
## Remediation
Google 

### 2026-10-27 15:13 UTC: resolved
## Incident Report
### \*\*Summary\*\*
On Monday, 19 Oct 2026 (Tuesday, 20 Oct BST), a data center facility that hosts europe-west2-b, experienced an external electrical power disruption. This resulted in service unavailability for workloads located in this zone. As traffic was redirected to alternative cloud regions or unaffected zones within europe-west2 cloud region, these workloads experienced transient latency and elevated errors affecting services across europe-west2. 
The primary impact was mitigated after 6 hours 8 minutes.
### \*\*Root Cause\*\*
\*\*Facility architecture and background:\*\*
The data center facility in the UK region hosts Cloud clusters serving the europe-west2-b zone, which form part of the multi-zonal europe-west2 Cloud region. The site relies on a 2N utility power architecture—meaning the facility has complete duplicate power paths for every critical load—backed by a central high-voltage generator bank managed by a dual-redundant Programmable Logic Controller (PLC).
Primary utility power is supplied to the facility via two independent feeders (A and B), supplemented by a standby utility connection configured for manual campus-wide transfer during maintenance operations or emergency events. The two high-voltage primary feeders terminate at separate primary intake switchboards capable of closed-loop operation if either board is taken offline. Switching between the primary and standby utility providers utilizes open transitions and key interlocks to prevent parallel connections across sources.
Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) battery systems provide 5 minutes of autonomous runtime. This bridge power ensures uninterrupted operation while the PLC detects utility undervoltage events, initiates diesel generator startup, synchronizes the generators, and transfers the site load.
Prior to the utility disruption, the facility had been placed in a temporary single-feed (1N) bridged maintenance posture on the primary utility. Circuit breaker feeder B was physically opened and key-interlocked (Locked Out Tagged Out) to allow for corrective repairs following issues identified during a quarterly generator load test on 14 Oct 2026. Consequently, primary utility feed A was supporting the total critical load while repairs were conducted on the B feeder pathway.
\*\*Root Cause:\*\*
On Monday, 19 Oct 2026 at 22:53 US/Pacific (Tuesday, 20 Oct 06:53 BST), the primary utility provider experienced an outage on primary utility feed A, caused by an external underground cable fault on the utility network outside the data center facility.  
When the primary utility feed A was lost, the facility’s generator plant failed to receive a signal to automatically start and take critical load due to a design voltage-sensing and misconfiguration in the PLCs. The facility's static UPS battery banks carried the critical load as designed until their battery reserves depleted resulting in a complete power loss across data halls.
The investigation of the PLC configuration identified the root cause as a misconfiguration of the PLC logic that did not verify both an undervoltage condition and physical breaker position for both utility feeders. Instead, the PLC undervoltage sensing inputs were wired upstream (line side) of the isolated utility feed B breaker. The PLC was programmed to verify whether voltage was present on the feeder before commanding a generator start. As the utility feed B remained energized upstream, both PLCs sensed live upstream voltage on the disconnected path. As a result, the PLC logic indicated that a healthy utility source was available, even though the primary and secondary distribution feeds were de-energized, and did not issue a start command to the generator plant.;
The onsite facilities team attempted to execute a remote load transfer via the PLC; however, the system inhibited the action. Recognizing that the UPS battery reserves would be exhausted before further remote operations could be resolved, the team transferred th

### 2026-11-04 21:15 UTC: resolved
# Incident Report
## Summary
On Monday, 19 Oct 2026 at 22:53 US/Pacific (Tuesday, 20 Oct 2026, 06:53 BST), a data center facility that hosts europe-west2-b, a zone within the europe-west2 cloud region, experienced an external electrical power disruption. This resulted in service unavailability for workloads located in this zone. The subsequent failover of these workloads to unaffected zones and alternate regions caused transient latency and elevated error rates across the broader europe-west2 region.
The resolution of the main impact was completed within 6 hours and 8 minutes.
## Root Cause
\*\*Facility architecture and background:\*\*
The data center facility in the UK region hosts Cloud clusters serving the europe-west2-b zone, which form part of the multi-zonal europe-west2 Cloud region. The site relies on a 2N utility power architecture—where the facility has complete duplicate power paths for every critical load—backed by a central high-voltage generator bank managed by a dual-redundant Programmable Logic Controller (PLC).
Primary utility power is supplied to the facility via two independent feeders (A and B), supplemented by a standby utility connection configured for manual campus-wide transfer during maintenance operations or emergency events. The two high-voltage primary feeders (A and B) terminate at separate primary intake switchboards capable of closed-loop operation if either board is taken offline. Switching between the primary and standby utility providers utilizes open transitions and key interlocks to prevent parallel connections across sources.
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) battery systems provide approximately five minutes of autonomous runtime. This bridge power ensures uninterrupted operation while the PLC detects utility undervoltage events, initiates diesel generator startup, synchronizes the generators, and transfers the site load.
Prior to the utility disruption, the facility had been placed in a temporary single-feed (1N) bridged maintenance posture on the primary utility. Circuit breaker feeder B was physically opened to allow for corrective repairs following issues identified during a quarterly generator load test on 14 Oct 2026. Consequently, primary utility feed A was supporting the total critical load while the feed B breaker remained in an open position to allow repairs to be conducted on the B feeder pathway.
\*\*Root Cause:\*\*
On Monday, 19 Oct 2026 at 22:53 US/Pacific (Tuesday, 20 Oct 2026, 06:53 BST), the primary utility provider experienced an outage on primary utility feed A, caused by an external underground cable fault on the utility network outside the data center facility.
Following the loss of primary utility feed A, a voltage-sensing design flaw and PLC misconfiguration prevented the facility’s generator plant from receiving an automatic start signal to assume the critical load. Consequently, static UPS battery banks sustained the critical load as intended until their reserves were used up, leading to a loss of power across the data halls.
The investigation of the PLC configuration identified the root cause as a misconfiguration of the PLC logic that did not verify both an undervoltage condition and physical breaker position for both utility feeders. Instead, the PLC undervoltage sensing inputs were wired upstream (line side) of the isolated utility feed breakers. The PLC was programmed to verify whether voltage was present on the line side of the feeder before commanding a generator start. At the time of the power event on 19 Oct 2026, the Utility feed B remained energized upstream while its incomer feed was in open position. Consequently, the active and standby master PLCs, which were running identical control logic, sensed live voltage from feed B through shared upstream sensors on the disconnected path. As a result, the PLC logic indicated that a healthy utility source was available, even though the primary and secondary distribution feeds were de-energized, and did not issue a sta

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