# Degraded availability for GitHub Actions, GitHub Pages and Webhooks

- Provider: [GitHub Actions](https://down.guide/github-actions)
- Level: confirmed
- Impact: Major outage
- lasted 1h 8m
- started 2026-10-19 15:49 UTC
- Webhooks, Actions, Pages
- id: DWN-5fcecd1156
- Official page: https://stspg.io/nrv2k8s68bwn

## Root cause
> We are continuing to investigate the cause of the initial connection timeouts.

[Postmortem](https://stspg.io/nrv2k8s68bwn)

## Updates from GitHub Actions
### 2026-10-19 15:49 UTC: investigating
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions and Pages

### 2026-10-19 15:50 UTC: investigating
Webhooks is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

### 2026-10-19 15:56 UTC: investigating
We’re are currently investigating degraded availability affecting GitHub Actions, GitHub Pages and Webhooks. 
Customers may experience delays in workflow processing, site builds and webhook delivery.

### 2026-10-19 16:30 UTC: investigating
We’re seeing recovery following mitigation and are continuing to monitor. 
Customers may still experience delays in GitHub Actions workflow status updates, GitHub Pages deployments, and check and workflow webhook events generated by Actions runs.

### 2026-10-19 16:56 UTC: monitoring
Actions, Pages and Webhooks are operating normally.

### 2026-10-19 16:56 UTC: resolved
On October 19, 2026, between 15:24 and 16:52 UTC, GitHub Actions, GitHub Pages, and webhooks generated by Actions were degraded. Live updates on GitHub.com and code search were also degraded for part of this time. No data was lost. 
Impact 
 - Workflow status updates, logs, and checks were delayed. 
 - 5.13% of jobs on GitHub-hosted runners were delayed in starting, and 0.02% of workflow runs failed. 
 - During the first 30 minutes, 8.47% of requests to the Actions jobs REST API returned errors. 
Pages deployments and webhooks generated by Actions runs were delayed. 
An internal Actions service that stores logs and run status lost connections to some of its cache servers in one cloud region and immediately retried them from every server at once. The resulting surge of new connections overloaded a shared network link between our data center and that region, which also disrupted other services that use the same link. We mitigated the incident by moving the Actions service off the affected cache servers and reducing connections from other services on the link. We then processed the delayed Actions work. We are continuing to investigate the cause of the initial connection timeouts. 
We were already in the process of rolling out a limit on how quickly this service can open new connections, but it was still in shadow mode (logging only, not enforcing) at the time of the incident. We have since fully enforced it and capped the service's concurrent connection attempts. We are extending these limits to other Actions services, adding backoff to retries, limiting how much shared network capacity a single service can use, and improving alerting so we can find the source of connection surges faster.

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