Incident with Actions

What to do

• Check whether you use GitHub Actions Actions. Check your stack

  Paste a package.json, lockfile, Terraform or a list of domains at down.guide/stack to see every provider you depend on.

• Confirm your retries, queues and scheduled jobs caught up after the 26m it lasted.

  Anything that failed between 2026-07-25 08:59 UTC and 2026-07-25 09:25 UTC may need a replay.

• Subscribe to GitHub Actions's feed to hear about the next one first. RSS feed

  https://down.guide/feed?provider=github-actions works in Slack (/feed subscribe), Discord feed bots and any RSS reader.

Updates from GitHub Actions 4

1. investigatingJul 25, 2026, 8:59 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions

   provider

2. monitoringJul 25, 2026, 9:13 AM UTC

   The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

   provider

3. monitoringJul 25, 2026, 9:20 AM UTC

   We identified an issue causing delays in GitHub Actions run starts. Some users may have experienced longer than expected wait times when triggering workflow runs. We have applied mitigations and have recovered. Our team continues to monitor and investigate the root cause.

   provider

4. resolvedJul 25, 2026, 9:25 AM UTC

   On July 25, 2026, GitHub Actions experienced two related periods of degradation that caused some workflow runs to be delayed by more than 5 minutes or end with infrastructure failures. First period (08:45 – 09:13 UTC): During planned maintenance on a critical-path Redis cluster for Actions, one participating region was left in a degraded state. Separately, an independent capacity operation temporarily removed another region from the cluster and redirected its traffic to the degraded region. This created cross-region inconsistencies in job-assignment state, causing workflow runs to be delayed, exhaust retries, or fail outright. At peak, about 7% of runs were delayed by more than 5 minutes, and 25% of runs failed with an infrastructure error during the course of the incident. We mitigated the incident at 09:13 UTC by returning traffic to its normal distribution. Second period (12:08 – 12:48 UTC): As part of mitigating the first incident, traffic was returned to the regional instance that was still undergoing its capacity increase. Multiple Redis nodes in the scaling region experienced failures, increasing traffic to healthy nodes and causing connection limits to be reached on many nodes. At peak, 30% of runs were delayed by more than 5 minutes, and 60% of runs failed with an infrastructure error during the course of the incident. We mitigated the incident at 12:48 UTC by redirecting workflow traffic away from the scaling region. We are adding stronger regional health and capacity checks before maintenance and requiring a stable observation period before restoring traffic. We are also improving automated connection resiliency, and partnering with our platform dependency to automatically detect and remediate unhealthy cluster members and shard imbalance. More generally, we already had work underway to improve the resiliency and scale of this piece of Actions infrastructure.

   provider

Corrections

None so far.

Something wrong on this page? Report an error or send us a note. Every fix is listed here.